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Rent-Seeking for a Risky Rent: A Model and Experimental Investigation 
1. Introduction 
Rent seeking (the spending and transferring of resources to privately capture 
value) is a prevalent problem in many settings. Typically, this problem has been 
described in the context of lobbying in order to obtain a monopoly rent (Tullock 1967). 
However, the inefficient quest for personal privilege which rent-seeking models describe 
can be observed in multiple settings and organizations, from pesticide legislation (Wise 
and Sandler 1994) to value formation in the art markets (Mossetto 1994 ). 
While a number of models of rent-seeking have been developed (e.g. Becker 
1968, Krueger 1974, Posner 1975, Tullock 1980), we know very little about actual rent-
seeking behavior, in part because this behavior is difficult to observe (some is even 
illegal). What we do know, suggests that the use of political influence over policy-
makers leads to high levels of inefficiency and social waste. Empirical estimates of social 
costs of rent-seeking range from 7% of GNP (Kreuger 1974) to 30-45% of GNP 
(Mohammad and Whalley 1984 ). 
This paper contributes to the literature on rent-seeking in a number of ways. First, 
we present a framework to organize different types of rent-seeking problems. Second, we 
develop a model of one of these problems, seeking a risky rent, and its equilibrium and 
comparative statics predictions (section 3). Finally, we present the results of an 
experiment designed to test these predictions (sections 4 and 5). The results of the 
experiment are consistent with ofthe comparative statics predictions of the model, 
however they suggest super-optimal rent-seeking expenditures. 
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1.1 The Framework 
Rent-seeking activities have been observed and described in a variety of 
circumstances. Our taxonomy of such activities distinguishes two features of the nature of 
the rent which we believe characterize different rent-seeking activities. 
First, the rent can be ali-or-none or shared. For example, when competing for an 
aU-or-none rent, like having a public park in one's neighborhood, the winner gets the 
whole prize at the end. No sharing is involved or possible. Alternately, there are some 
situations where rent-seekers compete for a share from a common pool, such as the 
allocation of the public budget among bureaus. 
A second feature ofthe rent is whether it is certain or risky. For example, when 
competing for a certain rent, like the aforementioned park, the payoff to the winner is 
certain and known to be so. In contrast, when competing for a risky rent, the value of the 
rent to the winner is not known for sure. A recent paper suggests that all rents which stem 
from the government might be uncertain in that funds allocated to a group from a 
governmental budget (perhaps the result of some rent-seeking game) may not be 
disbursed (Kahana and Nitzan 1998). 
Figure 1 shows examples for each possible outcome. The local park is a riskless, 
aU-or-none rent; the community's value for the park is presumably known in advance, 
and only one community can get it. In contrast, an allocation of a budget is a riskless, 
shared rent. The bureaus know their value from receiving the budget, but each gets a 
share of the budget rather than the whole thing. The process of a political appropriation is 
an example of a risky, all-or-none rent, in which a process of rent-seeking may determine 
whether a group receives a budget line, but the actual appropriation process is uncertain. 
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Finally, participating in a primary campaign is a risky, shared rent. If the candidate is 
elected, the campaign workers would share in the rents gained, however the election itself 
is uncertain. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
This paper presents a new theoretical and experimental investigation of rent-
seeking expenditures for risky, ali-or-none rents (the upper-right cell ofFigure 1). We 
derive and compare equilibrium and comparative static predictions with experimental 
results. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section provides a review of the previous 
research on rent-seeking. Section 3 introduces the experimental model and the hypotheses 
on equilibrium predictions and comparative statics. After describing the experimental 
design in section 4, results are analyzed in section 5. The paper ends with a discussion 
and suggestions for possible extensions. 
2. Previous Research 
In this section we briefly review two main categories of previous research in this 
area; theoretical and experimental. 
2.1 Theoretical Resean·h 
Tullock ( 1980) proposed a model of rent-seeking which we will later extend to the 
case of risky rents. In Tullock's model, n players (who can be viewed as individuals or 
interest groups composed by members with homogeneous interests) have well-defined 
preferences over the allocation of some social resources. In order to influence the policy-
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maker's decision, each player can invest some amount $x i in unproductive activities. The 
probability of obtaining player i 's preferred policy is assumed to be the following 
function of xi: 
where ai reflects the marginal etlect of rent-seeking ex penditure on the probability of 
getting one' s preferred outcome. 1 This parameter a i can be seen as a basic notion of 
political influence. The higher an individual's or group 's political influence over the 
social planner, the higher the agents' capacity to secure desirable outcomes for a given 
level of rent-seeking expenditure. 
Using this framework, each player solves the following decision problem in a 
noncooperative environment: 
xC:i 
MaxEU, = ---'-'--· u(R)+u(w, - x;) 
x i 
where R is an indivisible fixed rent; x i is the rent-seeking expenditure and wi is the initial 
wealth of player i. After solving for the set of N ash equilibria, Tullock concludes that 
there may be over, complete or under-dissipation of the rent by rent-seeking activities, 
depending on the number of players involved. 2 Nitzan ( 1994) presents a survey of other 
rent-seeking results. 
In the present study, we extend Tullock 's model to a risky ali-or-none rent (the 
upper right-hand cell ofFigure 1), assuming symmetric political influence (a;=1 'Iii). We 
solve for the Nash equilibrium of the new model, and derive some comparative statics 
5 
results of that equilibriwn. We then go on to experimentally test the equilibriwn point 
predictions and comparative statics. 
2.2 Experimental Research 
In contrast to theoretical work, experimental analysis of rent-seeking behavior is a 
relatively new approach. The first paper in this area, Millner and Pratt ( 1989), examine 
the effectiveness of rent-seeking (i.e. the parameter <X;) on the final outcome in Tullock's 
( 1980) rent-seeking game. Focusing on the two symmetric cases of <:x;= 1 and <:x;=3, their 
results indicate that increases in the marginal effectiveness of rent-seeking leads to higher 
dissipation ofthe final prize as predicted by the Nash equilibriwn, but the average 
dissipation rate is higher than predicted by Nash solution for <:x;= 1 and lower for <:x;=3. 
In an attempt to examine the effect of individual preferences on the final outcome, 
Millner and Pratt ( 1991) present a different experiment in which they test the theoretical 
predictions of Hillman and Katz (1984). They conclude, in contrast to the model ' s 
predictions, that relatively less risk-averse subjects dissipate more of the final rent. 
In other work, Shogren and Baik ( 1991) theoretically analyze the rent-seeking 
game with an exit option (allowing players not to participate). They show there is no 
Nash equilibriwn when <:x;>2 for all i. In addition, they design an experiment using an 
explicit one-shot payoff matrix, in which results are consistent with the theoretical 
prediction when <X; = 1. 
Finally, in two recent papers Davis and Reilly theoretically and experimentally 
examine the e±Iect of adding a strategic buyer who engages in rent-defending activities. 
In Davis and Reilly ( 1998a) they show that the introduction of such a buyer reduces social 
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costs. 3 In Davis and Reilly ( l988b ) , they show that adding multiple buyers ameliorates 
the benefits of adding one. 
In this paper, we test both the baseline predictions from our extended model and 
its comparative statics (the inf1uence of group size and initial endowments) in an 
experimental setting. In addition, we examine cultural factors and their inf1uence on rent-
seeking expenditures, using data from both the US and Turkey. 
3. The Model and Experimental Hypotheses 
This section describes our extension of Tullock 's ( 1980) model. Subsections 
describe the equilibrium strategies for symmetric and asymmetric games, and derive the 
comparative statics of the model. These theoretical results provide our hypotheses for the 
experiment. 
Consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, players participate in a 
rent-seeking contest in order to win a risky ali-or-none rent. In the second stage, the 
winner of Stage I competes against nature to determine the probability of receiving the 
rent. The ex pected value of the rent is a (positive) function of the winner's endowment 
remaining after rent-seeking expenditures have been made. 
Returning to the example of political appropriations, this can be interpreted in the 
following way: In the first stage, interest groups compete against each other in order to 
get funds from the Appropriations Committee. Once the funds are allocated, in the next 
stage, there is some chance they will not be disbursed. The probability of disbursement is 
related to the budget these interests groups have remaining. The winning group can then 
spend their remaining resources to secure their promised allocation. 
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Using the lottery framework proposed by Tullock, we model the expected utility 
of player i as 
f.!. ·u(R) In 
Eu J x . w . - x. i = ) I . I I • u(R) otherwise 
~ ~ wi xi + L.Jxi j 7i 
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where x; is player i' s rent-seeking expenditure in the first stage, l:xi is the aggregate 
j 7 i 
rent-seeking expenditure of the opponents; w; is player i's initial endowment; w;-x; is the 
amount left for the second stage and $R is the prize in monetary terms.4 
This formalization has a number of interesting properties. First, the probability of 
winning the contest is as in Tullock 's model with a;= 1. However, the rent earned is no 
longer certain but instead probabilistic. The probability of earning the rent is exactly the 
percentage of the individual's endowment remaining. Thus rent-seeking expenditures 
must be balanced against a reduced expected value ofthe prize if one wins the contest. 
A second nice property of this model of risky rent for purposes of experimentation 
is that it implements a binary lottery procedure, and thus, in theory, we need not concern 
ourselves about risk preferences of our subjects. Further discussion of the binary lottery 
procedure is presented below and in Roth and Malouf ( 1979). 
In our model, each individual thus faces the following problem: 
Max EU,(x,x_, ) 
x1e (O,w1 ] 
x. [(w. -x.} l 1 1 w, 1 1(R) , fori= l , ... , n 
x, + I.xj 
fl· i 
where R>O is a pre-determined and publicly known rent, expressed in monetary terms. 
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For a fixed 2:Xj , the first-order condition yields: 
I~i 
The corresponding best-response function can be derived from this set oftirst-order 
conditions: 
w. L.x* +(r.x*)~ -L.x.,jhr i=l, ... ,n 
l j~i 1 j -!-i J j -f"i J 
In this extended model, the optimal rent-seeking contribution is independent of 
the final prize R. Therefore we cannot draw any general conclusions about how much 
rent-dissipation takes place.5 
3.1 The Symmetric Game 
For a symmetric game in which all players have equal endowments (w; =w '\ti), 
the equilibrium strategies can be straightforwardly derived from simultaneously solving 
the set of best-response functions, which yields the equilibrium level ofrent-seeking 
expenditure: 
"' w(n- 1) . 
Xs = , fhr z = l , ... ,n 2n-l · 
It should be noted that while (xi,x-J=(O,O) is not an equilibrium outcome, it is Pareto-
efficient. 
In the symmetric endowment treatments of our experiment, then, we expect 
subjects to choose the equilibrium amount of rent-seeking expenditures. 
Hypothesis IS: When players' endowments are symmetric, we expect subjects to 
choose xs * of rent-seeking expenditure. 
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3.2 The A!lymmetric Game 
For asymmetric games where w;:;t:wj, the same set of best response functions can be 
simultaneously solved, yielding an equilibrium prediction of: 
The equilibrium strategy x ;A"' is again Pareto-inferior to x;=O Vi. Note that the symmetric 
game solution above is simply a special case ofthe asymmetric game with w;=w Vi. 
In the asymmetric endowment treatments of our experiment, then, we expect 
subjects to choose the equilibrium amount of rent-seeking expenditures. 
Hypothesis lA: When players' endowments are asymmetric, we expect sub_jects to 
choose XiA * of rent-seeking expenditure. 
3.3 Comparative Statics f~lthe Model 
3. 3.1 Own Endowment 
Our second and third hypotheses involve the comparative statics effect of 
variations in the initial wealth allocation. The impact of increasing one player's wealth 
leaving others' endowment constant (either changing the symmetric wealth structure to an 
asymmetric one or increasing own wealth in an already asymmetric game) is intuitive, an 
increase in own endowment level holding all else constant increases the optimal rent-




____!i_ > 0 for n ~ 1 
dl.v; . 
This result leads us to Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: Subjects' rent-seeking expenditures will increase with an increase in 
their own endowment, keeping their opponents' endowment levels constant. 
3. 3.2 Opponents ' Endowment 
A similar increase in the opponents' endowment levels holding all else constant 
also increases optimal rent-seeking expenditures, but not by as much as an increase in 
one 's own endowment level: 
This result leads us to hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3: Subjects' rent-seeking expenditures will increase with an increase in 
their opponents' endowment, but not as much as with an increase in their own. 
3. 3.3 Number of Players 
The final comparative statics hypothesis involves the number of players. 
Equilibrium rent-seeking behavior is positively related to the number of players 
competing for the prize. Taking the derivative of the optimal expenditure, x/ and X iA *, 
with respect to the number of players, n, we can show that expenditure increases with 
group size in both symmetric and asymmetric games, holding all else constant. 
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()x*. w(3n -l) 
-
8 
= " > 0 for n ~ l 
dn 2(2n-lt 
()x* 
__J,i > 0 1or n > l (}z .!' -
These results lead us to hypothesis 4: 
Hypothesis 4: Subjects' rent-seeking expenditure will increase with an increase in 
the number of players. 
Our experimental design (as outlined in the next section) allows us to test 
hypotheses lS, lA, 2 and 3 directly. However, in the experiment we simultaneously 
increase both the number of players and their endowments. Since both have a positive 
effect on an individual's rent-seeking expenditures, we ex pect hypothesis 4 to hold in our 
experimental setting as well. The next section describes our experimental design in more 
detail. 
4. Experimental Design and Procedures 
4.1. Experimental Design 
The experiment designed to test these hypotheses consisted oftwo sessions (one 
in the US and one in Turkey). There were four treatments in each session, varying in 
group size and initial endowment levels. Table l shows the parameters for each 
treatment, together with the equilibrium predictions for optimal rent-seeking 
expenditures. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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This experimental design allows us to test our hypotheses detailed above. First, 
we compare rent-seeking expenditures against the Nash equilibrium predictions in both 
symmetric and asymmetric groups. 
To test the comparative statics hypothesis about own wealth, we compare 
expenditures by subjects in two-person symmetric groups whose endowments are 30 with 
those in two-person asymmetric groups whose endowments are 60 (this comparison keeps 
constant the number of players and the endowments of others). The prediction is that 
rent-seeking expenditures should increase by 7 units (moving from 10 to 17). 
To test the comparative statics hypothesis about others' wealth, we compare 
expenditures by subjects whose endowments are 30 in symmetric groups with those in 
asymmetric groups (this comparison keeps constant the number of players and own 
endowment, changing only the endowment of others in the group). The increase in the 
equilibrium rent-seeking expenditures with an increase in opponents' endowment is 
positive but incremental with these parameters (moving from 10 to 11 in the two-person 
case and 13 to 14 in the four-person case). 
To test the comparative statics hypothesis about the number of subjects, we 
compare expenditures by subjects in two-person groups with those in four-person groups. 
This comparison can be done in a way which keeps the subjects ' own endowment 
constant (e.g. a 30-endowment subject in a two-person symmetric group versus a 30-
endowment subject in a four-person symmetric group), but allows the total wealth of the 
others in the group to increase as well. Since our analysis of these two effects suggest 
both are both positive, we expect to see a significant increase in this comparison. We can 
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compare the size of this effect and the previous one to determine the extent to which the 
increase in expenditures is caused by the increase in the number of rent-seekers in the 
group versus the increase in the endowments of others. 
4.2. Experimental Procedures 
Two sessions were run, one in the US (n= 174) and the other in Turkey (n= 127). 
The US subject pool was drawn from the University of Pennsylvania undergraduate 
students enrolled in an introductory course in public economics. The subject pool in 
Turkey was recruited from undergraduate students majoring in business administration at 
Bogazici University. Subjects were paid a show-up fee of$3 (300,000 TL in Turkey) as 
well as their earnings in the experiment. 6 All subjects received their earnings privately 
after the experiment had ended. 
The experiments in Turkey were run in Turkish by the same experimenter who ran 
the US sessions. All instructions were translated and back-translated. A copy of the 
instructions in English is reproduced as Appendix B; a Turkish copy as well as the raw 
data from the experiment is available from the authors upon request. 
The experiment used a between-subject design, thus no subject participated in 
more than one session. All treatments were conducted in a classroom. Subjects were 
seated so that that they could not communicate with one another and groups assigned 
randomly and anonymously. 
The experimenter distributed the instructions and read them aloud to create 
common information (if not common knowledge). Subjects were given 10 minutes to 
make their decisions. A post-ex perimental quiz was given to check if the subjects 
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understood the instructions and the rules of the game. Six participants ±rom US and 11 
±rom Turkey were excluded based on their performance, leaving 80 subjects in both of the 
symmetric treatments; 66 in the 2-person asymmetric treatment and 68 in the 4-person 
asymmetric treatment. 
The game was implemented as follows. Each player received some predetermined 
number of cards. In the first stage, each player chose how many of the cards to spend by 
sending the appropriate number of cards to the experimenter. The experimenter then 
mixed all the cards for each group together and chose one. This determined the winner of 
the rent-seeking game in each group. 
The winner then participated in a lottery in the second stage. For this lottery, the 
remaining cards of the winning player were mixed with blank ones to sum to the 
prespecitied total of their endowment, wi. A random draw was then made. Ifthe card 
drawn was one of the player' s, they won $R =$20 (or 2,000,000 TL). The game ended 
after this drawing. Participants were paid privately and left the room. 7 
This experimental model implements a binary lottery procedure, which in theory 
induces risk-neutral behavior (Roth and Malou±: 1979). By normalizing u($20)=1 and 
u($0)=0, the expected utility ofthe game becomes 
If subjects are expected-utility maximizers, we expect them to act as risk-neutral players 
in this game. 
5. Results and Discussion 
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5.1 Overview 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of rent-seeking expenditures for the symmetric 
(w;=30) and asymmetric groups (w;=30 and wj=60). The optimum bids are also included 
to compare the results with the theoretical predictions. 11 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
The results suggest than most of the subjects spent more than the predicted level 
of rent-seeking expenditures. In symmetric groups of 2 and 4 , the average rent-seeking 
expenditures were 15.41 and 17.39, exceeding the equilibrium predictions of 10 and 13. 
The results trom the asymmetric groups are similar. On average, there is excessive 
expenditure relative to the equilibrium prediction, for both low and high-endowment 
types. The next subsection presents some statistical tests ofthese observations. 
5.2 Hypothesis lS, lA: Equilibrium Predictions 
The first question posed by our study is the extent to which the point predictions 
of the rent-seeking game's equilibrium are supported by the experimental data. Table 2 
presents the average rent-seeking expenditure in each treatment, and the results of a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test in order to test whether the actual expenditures are 
significantly different trom the ones predicted by the theory. 9 
Insert Table 2 about here 
In the symmetric game, levels of rent-seeking expenditures are significantly 
higher than the Nash equilibrium predictions, for subjects in the US and Turkey, and for 
groups of size 2 and of size 4 (p<.O 1 for all). In the asymmetric game, average rent-
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seeking expenditures are significantly higher than the equilibrium prediction for both 
low- and high-endowment types in the 2-person treatments in both the US and Turkey 
(p<.Ol for all), and for the low-endowment types in the 4-person treatments (p<.05 in U S, 
p<.Ol in Turkey). However, the mean expenditure for the high-endowment subjects in the 
4-person treatment is not statistically different than the predicted value in either country. 
Although the overall average rent-seeking ex penditures are slightly higher for the subject 
group in Turkey, none of the di±Ierences are statistically significant. 10 
Two further analyses of subjects' play are of interest. First, though subjects may 
not be playing a Nash equilibrium, they may be playing a best-response to other subjects' 
actions. For each subject, we calculated their best-response to the actual actions of others 
in their group. We then calculated the difference between their actual expenditure and 
their best-response. Table 3 presents the average (and standard deviation) of differences 
in each treatment, pooled over the US and Turkey. A similar nonparametric test confirms 
that these differences are significantly positive. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
In all treatments, the mean rent-seeking expenditure is significantly higher than the best-
response predictions, indicating that subjects are over-investing in rent-seeking activities, 
not only above the Nash equilibrium level but even above the level of best-response to 
their counterpart' s actions. 
A second analysis involves the cost of this overexpenditure to the subjects. Table 
4 presents a comparison between the expected payoff in the Nash equilibrium, and the 
average expected payoffs for each subject in each treatment (using the exchange rate 
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described above). The final column presents the socially optimal payoff's, where each 
individual spends nothing on rent-seeking. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Actual earnings are systematically less than those at the Nash prediction. The 
deviation from Nash strategies led to a decrease in expected payoff's between 13% and 
48%. 
5.3 Hypothesis 2: Comparative Statics, Own Initial Endowments 
Comparative statics of our model predict that rent-seeking expenditures will 
increase when own initial wealth level increases. Table 5 displays the average increases 
in expenditures as own initial endowments increase. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
A direct test of this hypothesis compares the rent-seeking ex penditures by subjects 
in two-person groups whose endowments were 30 with those whose endowments were 
60, holding their counterpart' s endowments constant at 30. These results indicate that an 
increase in one's own initial wealth level (wi) leads to a significantly higher rent-seeking 
expenditure in both Turkey and the US (p<.O 1 for both). 
The hypothesis also supported by data from the four-person groups, although the 
test is less direct. Table 5 compares rent-seeking expenditures by subjects in four-person 
groups whose endowments were 30 with those whose endowments were 60. In addition 
to the subjectsi own endowments increasing, subjects in the latter group faced 
competitors with increased endowments as well. Both these comparative statics 
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hypotheses point in the same direction (increased rent-seeking) which is indeed observed 
in both the US and in Turkey (p<.05 for both). 
5.4 Hypothesis 3: Comparative Statics, Others' Initial Endowments 
Our second hypothesis involved the comparative static prediction of an increase in 
rent-seeking expenditures as the wealth of others in the group increases, holding own 
wealth constant. In Table 6 we compare the rent-seeking expenditures by subjects in two-
person groups whose endowments were 30 and whose competitors' endowments were 
either 60 or 30. In addition, we compare rent-seeking expenditures by subjects in four-
person groups whose endowments were 30 and whose competitors' endowments were 
either 150 (30, 60, 60) or 90 (30, 30, 30). 
Insert Table 6 about here 
The predicted effect of others' wealth was incremental (an increase of one unit) 
and was not observed in our experiment, possibly due to its small size. As Table 6 
shows, an increase in the opponents' wealth level did not have a statistically significant 
impact on subjects' rent-seeking expenditures in either two or four person groups. 
5. 5 Hypothesis 4: Comparative Stath's, Group Size 
Comparative statics of our model predict that rent-seeking expenditures will 
increase with an increase in the number of rent-seekers. In our experiment, we can 
compare rent-seeking expenditures of subjects with the same endowment in groups of 
size two and four. However, this change also involves increasing the endowment of 
others. The model predicts each effect individually should lead to an increase in rent-
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seeking expenditures, which is exactly what we see. 
To test for this increase statistically, a Wilcoxon nonparametric test was 
conducted to examine the difference between the mean ex penditures for 2-person and 4-
person groups. The results reveal that in all cases, the difference is statistically significant 
(p<.05). These results are reported in Table 7. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
The question about which change is causing the increase in expenditures, the 
increase in group size or the increase in others' endowment, can be answered by 
comparing the size of this efiect to that in the previous subsection, where only others' 
endowment was changed. We saw no significant effect of others' endowment on 
subjects' expenditures, but we do see a significant effect when we change both group size 
and others ' endowment. We conclude, then, that the change in group size itself has a 
significant effect on individual rent-seeking expenditures. 
5. 6 Summary ofResults and Discussion 
Results from this experiment were surprisingly consistent with the comparative 
statics predictions of the risky-rent seeking model we developed above. Rent seeking 
expenditures increased significantly as the player's own wealth level increased, as 
predicted by the model, in all the treatments. In addition, rent-seeking expenditures 
increased as the number of players (and their endowments) increased, although a simple 
increase in the endowment of others did not affect expenditures. 
However, the model's Nash equilibrium point prediction of rent-seeking 
expenditures was not observed. Instead, most subjects in both countries spent 
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significantly more toward rent-seeking activities , leading to more rent dissipation than 
predicted by the model. 11 We find that subjects' deviations from equilibrium result in 
lower payoffs than could have been achieved had they played the equilibrium (ranging 
from expected losses of 13% to 48%). Finally, we cannot explain the data by assuming 
that individuals play a best-response to their counterparts' play; their expenditures are 
still higher than the best-response predicts. 
Instead, we conjecture that in this two-stage game, individuals engaged in a 
myopic competition, focused mostly in winning the initial stage of political contest 
without taking into account the costs of winning in terms of expected value ofthe prize 
later on. Some arguments given in the post-experiment questionnaire reveal this rationale 
for overexpenditure in the lobbying stage. One subject wrote: 
Like a potential monopolist, I want to make it through the first stage. I'm 
willing to spend more now so that I can clear out my competition for later. 
Another told us 
I can control the percentage of winning in Stage II (given the total size of 
30 chips). However, I don't know what my opponents will submit in the 
first stage. 
If rent-seekers in the real world are indeed myopic, we expect to see much rent-
seeking in the first stage of appropriation games, but not enough left in the second stage, 
to guarantee the disbursement of funds. Thus we expect many funds to be allocated but 
not disbursed. For instance, in 1996 fiscal year, the US Congress authorized $6 billion 
for the privatization programs of the Department of Energy (DOE) but failed to 
appropriate most of these funds. Following this failure, DOE called only for $500 million 
in the 1999 fiscal year. This sharp decline in DOE's request may be a result of a shift in 
2 1 
their policy: Instead of engaging in a myopic rent-seeking game against other 
departments, DOE might have decided to spend their resources for the actual 
disbursement of their share. 
6. Conclusion 
Theoretical models (e.g. Tullock, 1980) as well as empirical work (e.g. Kreuger 
1974, Mohammad and Whalley 1984, Mossetto 1994, Wise and Sandler 1994) have 
demonstrated the inefficient use of resources caused by rent-seeking expenditures. This 
paper models rent-seeking expenditures for a risky rent and analyzes an experimental 
rent -seeking game of the same type. 
In our study, rent-seeking expenditures were found to be significantly higher than 
the theoretical predictions, creating more inefficiency than predicted. We conjecture that 
this result may have been caused by myopia on the part of the subjects. This conjecture is 
supported by anecdotal evidence. 
Additional analysis focused on testing the comparative statics properties of this 
rent-seeking model. These were generally supported by the experimental results. 
Expenditures were significantly and positively related to group size and one 's own wealth 
level. 
The experiment used subjects from two different countries: US and Turkey. 
Average expenditures were found to be somewhat higher in Turkey, although this 
difference was not statistically significant. Further empirical studies on cross-cultural 
ditlerences may provide further insight to the question whether cultural differences play a 
role in determining the level of lobbying expenditures. 
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Several additional questions (and follow-up studies) are suggested by our 
findings. One fundamental question is how to reduce the inefficiency associated with the 
observed, super-optimal, rent-seeking. For example, are there institutional arrangements 
which can reduce this inefficiency? Perhaps allowing for communication and/or collusion 
between the parties may lead rent-seekers toward a more efficient allocation of resources. 
Although in other settings like markets, collusion is often seen as reducing efficiency, in 
this setting it could help by allowing players to collude on low rent-seeking expenditures. 
Another institutional arrangement open for investigation is moving from a one-
shot to a finitely repeated game. This may represent a more realistic situation where 
lobbying groups interact repeatedly in the legislative arena. This move would open the 
door for two changes. First, collusion on low rent-seeking ex penditures might be easier 
to develop and sustain in this repeated setting. Second, subjects could learn about the 
(in)effectiveness of rent-seeking and may even become less myopic. 
A final institutional parameter which could affect the extent of observed 
inefficiency is the value of the risky rent, $R. Although the Nash equilibrium investment 
in lobbying does not depend on this rent parameter, in practice the size of the stake will 
likely affect the behavior of the participants. 
Rent-seeking, in the form of lobbying, political action committees or bribery, has 
important economic and social implications, for both efficiency and equity reasons. By 
studying individual behavior in the laboratory, under minimal institutional contexts, we 
can pinpoint the similarities and differences between behavior and game theoretic 
predictions, and can better make predictions about the actual behavior of interest groups 
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Table 1: Experimental Treatments and Equilibria 
#of Initial Predicted 
Players Endowments Expenditure 
on Rent -Seeking 
n=2 (30, 30) (10, 10) 
n=2 (30, 60) (11, 17) 
n=4 (30, 30, 30, 30) (13, 13, 13, 13) 
n=4 (30, 30, 60, 60) (14, 14, 23, 23) 
28 




A t• symme nc 
n=2, w=30, x *=11 
n=2, w=60, x *= 17 
n=4, w=30, x*=14 
n=4, w=60, x *=23 
* p <.05 
** p <.01 
US TURKEY 










2 1.78 23.81 
(5.57) (5.42) 
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Table 3: Average Differences: Actual Expenditures- Best-Response Expenditures 
n=2 
n=4 
* p <.05 










(1.38) ( 1.81) 
5.26** 5.88** 
(1.99) (2.07) 
Table 4: Expected Payoffs 
Initial Expected Payofi Expected Payoff Expected Payoff Social Optimum 
Endowment under Nash Observed (US) Observed (Turkey) Payoff 
30,30 $6.67 $4.58 $4.49 $10 
30,60 $3.51 $2.25 $1.81 $10 
30,60 $4.98 $4.02 $3.72 $10 
30,30,30,30 $8.70 $6.88 $6.78 $5 
30,30,60,60 $2.02 $1.76 $1.53 $5 
30,30,60,60 $3.83 $3.17 $3.15 $5 
3 1 
Table 5: Effect of Own Initial Wealth on Rent-Seeking Expenditures 
n=2 
(w; = 60) - (w; = 30) 
n=4 
(w; = 60) - (w; = 30) 
* p <.05 





Table 6: Effect of Opponents' Initial Wealth on Rent-Seeking Expenditures 
n=2 
(wj = 60) - (wj = 30) 
n=4 
(wj = 60) - (wj = 30) 
* p <.05 












* p <.05 






Figure 1: A Taxonomy of Rent-Seeking 
R" kl 0 lS ess utcome R" k 0 utcome ts cy 
AU-or-None Rent siting a local park political appropriation 
Shared Rent allocation of budget working on a primary 
among divisions campatgn 
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Appendix A: Derivation of Comparative Statics12 
A.l. Own Endowment 
Taking the derivative of x ";A with respect to wi yields 
Since n, w;, L w1 ~ 0, this expression is non-negative for all i and therefore as one's 
}7oi 
endowment increases, the equilibrium rent-seeking will also increase. 
A.2. Opponents' Endowment 
Taking the derivative of x ";A with respect to L w1 yields 
j# 
a~~~} = .22+ [ } # 2 J ll!J 
;,.; 128n3 wi1 +240n2w} ~w1 + 123nw;[ L .. . 1v1 ) + 16[~ w1 ) 
J -:#-l f"#- 1 J :#-1 
142.857nw; +57.1429L w1 
57.1429[4n21v~ +5nw;~ w1 +[~ w1 ) 2 ]· 40n 2w;2 +41mv;~ w1 + 8[~w1 )" 
f #-l .J::F-l J*-' j':#-1 
By simplifying and rounding to the nearest whole number we get 
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Since this expression is positive for n, w1 , L wj ~ 0 , we can conclude that 
j # 
ax:~ 2: wj ~ 0 for '\li. Hence, an increase in opponents' endowment leads to an increase 
/ a~,, 
in one's rent-seeking expenditures. 
A.3. Number f~lPlayers 
A.3.1 Symmetric Case 
The equilibrium rent-seeking ex penditure in the symmetric case is 
• w(n-1) . 
X r = , fh r l = l , ... , n 
·' 2n -1 · 
Taking the derivative with respect to n gives 
ax· w 
----l = , > 0 for all w > 0 dn (2n -1t · 
Therefore, the equilibrium rent-seeking expenditure increases with an increase in the 
number of players. 
A.3.2 Asymmetric Case 
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[ l28n-\t1 + 240n\t~2~ ltj + l23mt~(~ It';)" + 1 6(~ ltj ) 1]
4
/.l 
I *-t J '#-t f F-t 
for 'iii , which indicates that the equilibrium rent-
seeking expenditure increases with an increase in the number of players. 
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions (English) 
n=4, symmetric, wi = 30 
You are about to participate in an experiment about individual decision-making. If you follow 
the instructions carefully and make a good decision, you will have the opportunity to win $20. 
Instructions 
You are randomly grouped with three of your classmates. You will not be told who the other 
members of your group are. All the decisions will be made privately. Please do not speak to 
anyone during the experiment. 
Each of the group member is given an empty yellow envelope and a white envelope with 30 
index cards inside. The index cards are identified with a group number and a letter assigned 
to you as an identification within your group. For instance, 7B means you are player Bin 
group 7. 
Please take your index cards out of the envelope and look at your ID number and your own 




When you finish, please turn over to the next page. 
We now explain the experimental procedure. In the first stage, you will put some of your 
cards into the yellow envelope that is provided and return the yellow envelope to the 
instructor. Note that you cannot observe your opponents' contribution. You are going to keep 
the rest of your index cards in the original white envelope. 
The instructor will then mix both your and your opponents' contributions and pick 
one card. If it is one of yours, you will have the opportunity to participate in the lottery. If it is 
not, you will gain nothing and one of the other group members will play the lottery. Your 
probability of being a finalist depends on the ratio of cards you submit to the total number of 
cards submitted. In other words, if you submit X cards and your opponents submit a total of 
Y, the probability of you winning this bidding is ~-If there is a tie (i.e. both you and 
X+Y 
some other group member submits the same amount of cards), you will have an even chance 
of being chosen. 
In the next stage, the finalist will participate in a lottery to win $20. The procedure of the 
lottery is as follows: The finalist will give his/her white envelope with the remaining cards to 
the instructor. The instructor will then add blank cards to the finalist's cards in order to add 
up to a total of 30 index cards. Then one draw will be made. If the card is one of the finalist's, 
he/she will get $20. If not, he/she will get nothing. Therefore, the probability of winning the 
lottery is determined by the ratio of the number of the remaining index cards ofthe finalist to 
30. 
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For instance, suppose you submit 10 cards in the first stage and your opponents submit 5, 10 
and 15. Your probability of being a finalist in this case is 10 2.2 =..:!. 
5+ 1 0+ 1 0+ 15 40 4 
If you become the finalist, your 20 remaining cards will be mixed with 10 blank cards and a 
random draw will be made. Your probability of winning the $20 lottery prize, in this second 
stage, is _lQ_ = 20 =1 
20+10 30 3 
The following table reflects your probability of winning the $20 lottery prize, if you are 
given the opportunity to participate in the lottery. 
no of cards left prob ofwinning !no of cards left prob of winning 
0 0 16 0.53 
1 0.03 17 0.56 
2 0.06 18 0.60 
3 0.10 19 0.63 
4 0.13 20 0.66 
5 0.16 2 1 0.70 
6 0.20 22 0.73 
7 0.23 23 0.76 
8 0.26 24 0.80 
9 0.30 25 0.83 
10 0.33 26 0.86 
11 0.36 27 0.90 
12 0.40 28 0.93 
13 0.43 29 0.96 
14 0.46 30 1.00 
15 0.50 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions about the procedure. 
Now decide how many of your index cards you are willing to submit in the first stage. Put 
that number of cards into the yellow envelope. Close the envelope and raise your hand. 
The monitor will come to collect the envelope. Keep the rest of your index cards inside 
the original white envelope. 
The first stage of the experiment is now over. Once all yellow envelopes are collected, the 
4 1 
experimenters will note the finalist from each group. Please do not go on to the next page 
until the monitor picks up your yellow envelope. 
After all the envelopes are collected, the instructor will mix the contributions in each 
group and pick one card. The group number and letter of the finalists will be written on 
the blackboard. Once all the drawings are made, the finalists will go outside the 
classroom one by one to participate in the lottery. 
For all the participants except the finalists, the experiment is now over. Thank you for 
your participation. Please wait at your desk until the monitor collects this sheet and your 
original white envelope with the remaining cards. 
For the finalists, please step forward with your original white envelope with the 
remaining cards and this instruction sheet in order to participate in the lottery. 
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Endnotes 
1A related line of research models an indivisible rent-seeking game as an all-pay auction 
(e.g. Anderson eta/. 1998, Baye eta/. 1993, Baye et a/. 1996, Bliss and Na1ebuff 1984, 
Holt and Sherman 1982). In an all-pay auction, all bidders pay their respective bids up 
front (as though they all invested in rent-seeking activities) and the prize (the final rent) is 
given to the highest bidder (the player with the highest rent-seeking expenditure). 
Tullock's ( 1980) and other rent-seeking models difier from all-pay auctions in that the 
highest bidder is not guaranteed the prize, but instead receives it with some probability. 
2This result helped to organize much of the previous theoretical literature in which 
authors argued over whether the rent is over-dissipated by rent-seeking expenditure (e.g. 
Tullock, 1967), exactly dissipated (e.g. Becker 1968, Krueger 1974, Posner 1975) or 
under-dissipated (Hillman and Samet, 1987). Other theoretical studies have attempted to 
identify different determinants of rent dissipation like entry (Corcoran and Karels 1985, 
Higgins, eta/. 1985), number and homogeneity of competitors (Gradstein 1994, Hillman 
and Riley 1989, Nitzan 1991), number ofwinners (Berry, 1993), risk preferences of 
players (Hillman and Katz, 1984 ), competition (Ellingsen 1991, Schmidt 1992). Recent 
theoretical work has focused on the endogenous formation of rents (Appelbaum and Katz 
1986, Gradstein 1993, Chung 1996, Ursprung 1990, Riaz, Shogren and Johnson 1995). 
3Interestingly, this paper also shows more rent dissipation occurs in all-pay auctions 
(where the highest player earns the rent for sure) than in rent-seeking games (where 
player' s probabilities of winning the rent are a function of their rent-seeking activities). 
4Unlike Tullock's model, here any wealth remaining after rent-seeking is not consumed 
directly but instead used to increase the probability of receiving the rent. Our 
experimental implementation will be consistent with this feature of the model. Adding an 
additional use of endowment (direct consumption) changes the equilibrium level of rent-
seeking expenditures, but does not affect the comparative statics implications of the 
model. 
5For instance, for a 2-person symmetric game with w;=wj=15, the total rent-seeking 
expenditure will be $10. The rent will be overdissipated if it is below $10, exactly 
dissipated if it is $10 and underdissipated if it is more than $10. 
6The exchange rate was approximately $1 = 100,000 TL at the time ofthe experiment. 
7For instance, in the treatment with n=2 and w1=w2=30, suppose Player 1 submits 5 cards 
in the first stage and her opponent submits 10. The probability of Player 1 winning the 
first stage is 5/( 1 0+5)=.33. After the drawing, if she becomes the finalist, her remaining 
25 cards are mixed with 5 blank cards and a second draw is made in Stage II. The 
probability of her winning this stage is 25/(25+5)=.83. 
43 
x Although in asymmetric groups some subjects could allocate up to 60 tokens toward 
rent-seeking activities, in practice no subject allocated more than 30. We thus keep the 
scale of the x-axis the same in these graphs to facilitate comparisons. 
9Since the Shapiro-Wilk test shows that the 2-person asymmetric treatment in Turkey and 
the 4-person asymmetric treatment in the US are not normally distributed (p<.05), 
nonparametric tests are used for all subsequent analysis. 
10These comparisons are on the basis of absolute deviations from the Nash equilibrium. 
As one seminar participant suggested, we can also look at percentage deviations from the 
Nash equilibrium. For each subject we can calculate the difference between their 
expenditure and the equilibrium expenditure, then divide that difference by the 
equilibrium expenditure to calculate the percentage differences. For the symmetric games, 
the average percentage deviation from equilibrium is 53% (n=2) and 41% (n=4 ). For 
asymmetric games, low income players the deviation is 48% (n=2) and 44% (n=4) and for 
high income players the deviation is 42% (n=2) and 37% (n=4). 
' 'One seminar participant suggested that subjects' risk aversion may be causing the over-
expenditure. The procedure in this experiment, equivalent to a binary lottery procedure, 
should in theory induce risk-neutrality. However, even if it did not, it seems unlikely that 
risk aversion could cause overexpenditure in the first stage since both stages are risky. 
Overexpenditure in Stage 1 leads to a higher-risk lottery in Stage 2. 
12The derivations in Appendix A are obtained by Mathematica 3.0. 
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